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clude important exemptions, such as the Missouri homestead
exemption, 63 the federal Social Security exemption, the federal limitations
on wage garnhishment, 6 4 and notice of specific procedures by which to
claim an exemption.
KAY E. SOOTER

OPEN-SPACE ZONING AND THE
TAKING CLAUSE: A TWO-PART TEST
Agins v. City of Tiburon1
The City of Tiburon, California rezoned the Agins' property to
"RPD-I," a residential planned development and open-space zone,
limiting uses to one-family dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-space
uses. The new zoning restricted the density of construction, allowing the
2
Agins to build up to five single-family dwellings on their five acre tract.
The Agins sued Tiburon seeking a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the zoning ordinace. They claimed that the city had "taken"
their property in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the
Constitution. 3 The Agins contended that rezoning the land "prevented..,
[its] development for residential" use and "completely destroyed the value
of [appellants'] property for any purpose or use whatsoever." 4 The Califor63. RSMo §§ 513.475-.530 (1978).
64. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1976 & Supp. III
1979). Other possible state exemptions to include are those for various retirement
benefits (policemen under RSMo §§ 86.190, .353, .493, .563, .780 (1978);
firemen under id. §§ 87.090, .365, .485; school teachers and employees under id.
§§ 169.090, .380, .520, .587; other state employees under id. § 104.540.2);
workmen's compensation benefits under id. § 287.260; unemployment compensation benefits under id. § 288.380(10); and the proceeds from some life insurance policies under id. § 376.560. Other possible federal exemptions to include are those for armed forces retirmdnt benefits under 10 U.S:C_. § 1440,
1450(i) (1676) and civil service retirement benefits under 5 U.S.C. § 8346 (Supp.
III 1979).

1. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
2. Agins' property was the highest priced suburban land in California and
had been purchased by Agins to develop as an investment. Id. at 258.
3. "Taking" is the term used to describe the taking of property without just
compensation in violation of U.S. CONST. amend. V, as applied to the states
through the id. amend. XIV.
4. 447 U.S. at 258 (brackets in original).
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nia Supreme Court declared that no taking resulted from the enactment of
the zoning ordinances because the ordinance did allow limited development for residential uses. 5
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the state court, holding
that the zoning ordinances substantially advanced legitimate state interests and did not deny the owners economically viable use of their land.
The Court further noted that the zoning ordinances benefitted the Agins'
land, did not prevent the best use of the land, and did not extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership; thus, the ordinances did not deny the
"'justice and fairness' guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend6
ments."
Agins marks the first time since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.7 that the Court has ruled on the facial constitutionality of a zoning
ordinance." In Euclid, the Court ruled that zoning ordinances were a valid
exercise of the police power and were constitutional unless "clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to public
health, safety, morals or general welfare." 9 Agins more sharply defined the
Euclid test, changing it to "substantially advance legitimate state
interests," 10 and adding a second requirement that the ordinance not deny
"an owner economically viable use of his land.""
Under the first part of the Agins test, the court asks whether a
legitimate state interest is substantially advanced by the zoning regulation.
In enunciating the test as "legitimate state interests," the Court replaced
the specific terms of the Euclid test with a general term, but the practical
difference may be slight because of the already broad interpretation given
5. The California Supreme Court would not allow an inverse condemnation challenge of the zoning ordinances, but limited the landowners' remedy to
mandamus and declaratory judgment. Id. at 259. The United States Supreme
Court did not reach the issue of a state's ability to limit constitutional remedies.
Id. at 263. The California limitation on remedies is rare, with only two states applying it..See Sproul Homes v. State Dep't of Highways,

-

Nev.

__

611 P.2d 620, 622 (1980); Eck v. City of Bismark, 283 N.W.2d 193, 200 (N.D.
1979).
6. 447 U.S. at 262-63.
7. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
8. Since Euclid'senunciation of the general test, most Supreme Court zoning decisions have focused on application of that test to a specific parcel of land.
See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Young v.
American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
9. 272 U.S. at 395.
10. 447 U.S. at 260.
11. Id.
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"general welfare" under the prior test.' 2 In analyzing the legitimate
governmental interest in the Tiburon zoning ordinance, the Court looked
at the intent of the Tiburon city council and found the ordinance to be a
valid protection "from the ill effects of urbanization."' 3 This finding
establishes that control of density is a legitimate state interest.14
The "substantial advancement" language of Agins and "substantial
relation" language of Euclid are similar. It is not clear how this change of
language will affect the Court's analysis in taking cases because the Euclid
lan_guage itself was subject to diverse interpretation. In its early application of Euclid, the Court invalidated zoning ordinances when it found no
substantial relation between the zoning of certain land and the promotion
of public health, safety, and general welfare. 5 In dealing with purely
economic interests, however, the court has retreated from the substantial
relationship test to a rational basis test. This conclusion finds support in
12. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133 (1978)
(landmark preservation); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305 (1976)
(historic preservation); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (spiritual,
physical, aesthetic, spacious, clean, and well-balanced are all values encompassed by general welfare).
13. 447 U.S. at 261 (citations omitted).
14. Until Agins, the Supreme Court had never ruled directly on the validity
of density control or on the extent to which a municipality could regulate density.
Nevertheless, control of density has long been considered by state courts to be a
legitimate state interest. Consequently, there are zoning ordinances controlling
density and open space throughout the country that could have been subject to
challenge if the Court had ruled in favor of Agins. See 1 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW
OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 3-1 n.1 (4th ed. 1976).
Zoning ordinances that control density have been challenged as being racially
discriminatory by excluding low- and moderate-income housing. In Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the
Court held that disproportionate impact must be accompanied by proof of intent
to discriminate before a zoning ordiance will be overturned on equal protection
grounds. State courts have responded to Arlington Heights by finding other
grounds to invalidate exclusionary zoning. See Wolfstone, The Casefor a Procedural Due Process Limitation on the Zoning Referendum: City of Eastlake
Revisited, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 51, 70 (1978). One approach used was defining the
public welfare as that of the region rather than that of the municipality. Under
this approach, a zoning authority had to consider regional needs of low-income
housing and could not adopt zoning that excluded more than its share of such
housing. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
15. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116
(1928) (zoning ordinance requirement of neighbor's approval for use of land as
home for orphans and aged did not bear substantial relation to protection of
general welfare); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (land as
zoned could not be developed for residential uses because of location and uses of
surrounding land).
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Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City, 16 where the Court
found the applicable analysis of zoning to be "whether the challenged
restriction reasonably can be deemed to promote the objectives of the community." 7 Use of this broader test is not surprising. When zoning regulations have been challenged on constitutional grounds other than taking,
the rational basis test almost always has been applied.", In fact, taking is
one of only two areas where the Court goes beyond rational basis in zoning
analysis.1 9 While the Agins substantial advancement language appears to
be a higher standard of review than the rational basis standard, 20 by
upholding the Agins regulations, the Court nevertheless shows its extreme
reluctance to interfere with zoning authorities.
The second part of the A'gins test, the "economically viable use" portion, appears to promote language in a Penn Centralfootnote to black letter law. 21 The economically viable use test attempts to determine when the
exercise of the regulatory power constitutes a taking. This determination
was first broached in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2 2 where Justice
Holmes recognized that when diminution in value "reaches a certain
magnitude ... there must be ... compensation. ' 23 Since Pennsylvania
Coal, the Court has recognized diminution in value as one factor in determining the limits of regulation, but not as the sole factor in establishing a
taking. 24 In Penn Central, the Court focused on the "impact of [the]
16. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
17. Id. at 133 n.29.
18. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976)
(zoning of "adult" threatres not a violation of free speech); Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (defining "single-family" as no more than two
unrelated persons not an infringement on freedom of association, right to travel,
or a taking).
19. The other area is zoning regulations that usurp the right of privacy. See
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977) (zoning ordinance
defining "family" so as to preclude grandchild from living with grandparent was
invalid intrusion into privacy of family).
20. The Court has used substantial relationship language to evaluate
legislation under equal protection analysis of discrimination based on illegitimacy, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 264 (1978), and gender, Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976). The interpretation used by the Court since 1928, see
note 15 supra, in upholding zoning ordinances is similar to the rational basis test
used in equal protection analysis of economic regulation. Compare City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304 (1976) with Penn Cent. Tramp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 499 (1977); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976);
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
21. See 438 U.S. at 138 n.36.
22. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
23. Id. at 413.
24. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1979);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/7
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regulation" on the land involved and changed the focus from diminution
in value to limitations of existing uses of the land. 2
In analyzing the economically viable use of the land, the Agins Court
discussed three factors that had been used in Penn Central 6 to determine
the impact of a zoning regulation: specificity of the harm, available use of
the property, and appropriation. 27 In analyzing specificity of harm, the
Court weighed the private and public interest and determined whether
this parcel's proportionate share of the public benefit was significant. The
Agins Court found that the ordinance benefitted Agins' property by
"assuring careful and orderly development of residential property."28 The
benefit to Agins did not recompense the actual reduction in land value,
but that there was any benefit at all tipped the balance in favor of the
public interest.
To evaluate the available use factor, the Court asked whether the
ordinance denies the owner the "best use" of his land. Because best use 2 9 in
the context of zoning and land use has a variety of interpretations, the
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 674 n.8 (1976);
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).
While stating that diminution alone is not sufficient to establish a taking, the
Court repeatedly has stated that it is not deciding whether a complete destruction
of value is a taking. 447 U.S. at 260; City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 674 n.8 (1976); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590, 594 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1946). The Court
had the opportunity to decide this issue in Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City
of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 37 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appealdismissed,
371 U.S. 36 (1962). In that case, the value of the land had been diminished completely by a zoning ordinance because the land could not be used for the purpose
allowed by the ordinance. Instead of deciding the issue, the Court dismissed the
appeal for lack of a federal question. 371 U.S. 36 (1962). See Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 43 (1964).
25. 438 U.S. at 137. The Court's early discussion of diminution focused on
the inability of the landowner to earn an adequate return on his investment. See
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). In determining diminution of value, the focus
of the Court recently has not been on the value of property as a profitable investment, but rather on the value of the property in light of the uses remaining. See
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979); Penn Cent. Tramp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 141 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 674 n.8 (1976); Goldblatt v. Town of
Htmpstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). One court has extended this shift in focus
so far as to determine diminution in value of swampland on the basis of its natural
condition, rather than its value as drained and filled for development. SeeJust v.
Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
26. 438 U.S. at 133-37.
27. 447 U.S. at 262.
28. Id.
29. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
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A gins definition of best use is unclear. There are at least four possible interpretations: residential use, the investor's desired use, the existing use,
and reasonable use. Residential use has been viewed as the best or highest
use of land from society's perspective. 30 Using this definition, it would
seem that as long as zoning allows land to be used for residential purposes,
the owner is not denied economically viable use of the land, and government will have broad power in regulating land use. The Agins Court appears to support this interpretation by emphasizing that while Agins' options are reduced by the regulation, the land can be used for residential
purposes.3 1 The authority the Court uses in supporting its discussion of
3 2
best use, however, does not involve any discussion of residential use.
"Investment-backed expectation '33 is another possible interpretation.
This interpretation would limit governmental power to zone in any manner that would reduce the landowner's expectation of profit. It is given
some support by Agins' reliance on UnitedStates v. Causby,3 4 which found
that a taking occurred when the land could not be used as the landowner
desired, even though some value did remain. 5 In addition, the
investment-backed expectation theory appears to conflict with other
Court holdings that a taking does not occur even if the best use, from the
investor's perspective, is prevented.3 6 This apparent conflict might be
reconciled by applying the third interpretation, "existing use," to Agins.
The authority used by the Court focused on the inability of the landowner
to use his land as he had used it prior to the government interferences,
rather than on the expectations of the owner.3 7 This is the interpretation
30. 1 R. ANDERSON,AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 8.14 (1968).
31. 447 U.S. at 262.
32. The Agins Court found support in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256
(1946). Causby could not use his land as a chicken farm because of low flights of
military planes directly over his land. The Court noted that some use still
remained in the land, but the limit in utility of the land did cause a diminution.
Id. at 262. This was not the Court's reason for finding a taking. The taking occurred because of the quality of the interference (a physical invasion creating an
easement) and not the quantity of the interference (diminution in value). Id. at
263. Thus, it is not clear why the Court in Agins relied on Causby to support the
best use factor when the Causby decision apparently was based on an extinction of
a "fundamental attribute of ownership." See note 42 and accompanying text in-

fra.
33. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
This interpretation is similar to the Court's early use of diminution of value. See
note 24 supra.
34. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
35. See note 32 supra.
36. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (ordinance
preventing excavation below the water table did not constitute taking even
though it closed mining operation).
37. See cases cited note 32 supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/7
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followed in analyzing Penn Central.3 8 Agins appears to follow this interpretation by emphasizing that the landowner could still use the land for
the same general purpose, i.e., residential, he had intended before the
3 9
rezoning, but not to the extent he had planned.
The existing use interpretation, however, conflicts with decisions that
hold down-zoning from existing uses not to be a taking. 4° Appropriate or
reasonable use is the only interpretation that does not conflict with other
Court decisions. It is a determination of whether the uses allowed by the
zoning are appropriate for the land involved. If the remaining uses are not
reasonable uses of the property, there is a taking.41 Apparently the Court
in Agins and Penn Central is stating merely that not only are the remaining residential uses reasonable and appropriate, but they are also the
existing use and the best use from the investor's perspective.
The third factor analyzed in determining whether the owner was
denied economically viable use of his land was whether there was an
appropriation of land by the government. The Court used the term
"extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership, 42 but did not define
"fundamental attribute of ownership." Prior Court decisions make it clear
that some traditional property rights can be destroyed without a taking
occurring. 43 The authority relied on in Agins indicates that the property
rights that are fundamental attributes of ownership are those property
rights that, if extinguished, would result in a physical invasion of the land
by the government. 44 A physical invasion of the land would in effect be the
appropriation of an interest in the land by the government. 4"
Agins gives zoning authorities almost unlimited power in using zoning
to control density and guarantee open space. It broadly interprets the
scope of legitimate state interests and indicates that the Court is likely to
uphold zoning regulations as a substantial advancement of those interests.
38. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
39. 447 U.S. at 262.
40. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
41. C.F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491 F.2d 834, 838 (10th Cir. 1974); Kent Island
Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 460 (D. Md. 1978).
42. 447 U.S. at 262.
43. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 n.27 (1978).
44. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (right of
exclusion is fundamental attribute of ownership because, if denied, physical invasion of land would occur); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (although
some property rights were destroyed there was no taking because there was no
physical invasion); Penn Cent. Tramp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136
(1978) (Landmark Law not appropriation because it only prohibited use of air
space and did not exploit land for city use); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256, 265 (1946) (low flights over land is appropriation of use of land).
45. See cases cited note 44 supra.
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